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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eugenio Caliz-Bautista appeals from the district court's order granting the State's motion
in limine, which prevented the defendant's expert witness, Dr. Greg Hampikian, from testifying.
Caliz was charged with Count I: Lewd Conduct with a Minor under Sixteen and Count II: Sexual
Abuse of a Child under the age of Sixteen. The expert witness offered testimony regarding the
potential for contamination during the DNA testing. The witness also proposed to testify that the
method the testing protocol used did not minimize the risk of contamination, and that this
manner of testing evidence was not in conformity with professional standards. In short, the
witness was going to explain how the testing done in this case created an unnecessary risk of
contamination, that the such contamination would not be caught by the lab's preventative
measures, and that it would be impossible to tell at this point whether the test results were a
product of contamination. After all other evidence in the trial was presented, and following an
offer of proof where Dr. Hampikian testified, the district court granted the State's motions.
The jury found Eugenio Caliz-Bautista not guilty of Count I: Lewd Conduct with a Minor
under Sixteen and guilty of Count II: Sexual Abuse of a Child under the age of Sixteen. On
appeal, Caliz asserts that the district court violated his constitutional right to present evidence
when it granted the State's motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On May 19, 2015, the complaining witness, E.M., accused Eugenio Caliz-Bautista of
raping her. (R., pp.20-23.) E.M. had been at home watching the three younger children (two twoyear-old children, and a one-year-old child) when Caliz allegedly took her into her room, got her
naked, and had sex with her. (Ex., pp.27-129) E.M. was promptly taken to the hospital and E.M.
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told doctors there that Caliz had taken her clothes of and had vaginal intercourse with her and
that "[i]t went in and out several times." (Ex., pp.127-130.) There was no mention of touching
her breast. (Ex., pp.127-130.) A week later, during a CARES interview, E.M. again told the
interviewer that Caliz had put his penis in her vagina. (Ex., p. l 05.) During this interview, E.M.
described Caliz touching her breasts and vagina, but did not mention any kind of oral contact.
(Ex., p.105.) 1
During the sexual assault evaluation conducted at the hospital, swabs were taken from her
vagina, rectum, mouth, peri-vaginal area, left breast, right breast, inner left thigh, belly button,
face, and right wrist. (Ex, pp. I 43, 165; Tr., p.318 II. 1-6.) E.M. told Dr. Reese that there was
fluid, and that "[i]t was wet and sticky" on the inside of her left thigh, and her vaginal area. (Ex.,
p.128.) During the evaluation, Dr. Reese also found a "thick white discharge inside of the
vagina." (Ex., pp. I 03, 129.) However, a "wet prep" this fluid did not show sperm or semen. (Ex.,
pp.117, 129-130, 137, and 141) Additionally, when the Idaho State Laboratory tested the swabs,
none of the swabs had semen or sperm on them. (Ex. p.165, Tr. 378-379.) Only three of the
swabs indicated any biologicals-amylase-and only the left breast swab had an elevated level
of amylase. (Ex., p.165; Tr., pp.379-380.)
Amylase is a protein-a digestive enzyme-found in a number of body fluids. (Tr.,
pp.383-384.) Saliva has a higher concentration of amylase, which is why it is used by the lab to
screen for potential DNA. (Tr. pp.368-370.) But amylase, does not itself contain DNA
molecules, nor is it unique to saliva. (Tr. pp.383-384.) Other body fluids including tears and even
sweat contain amylase. (Tr. pp.384-390, 435; Ex. p.417.) There is no way to distinguish between
those different sources. (Tr. p.391 LL.2-4).

1

The first reference to oral contact of any kind was months later, after the ISP lab results had
2

The Idaho State Laboratory used the amylase test results as the single factor to determine
what would be tested for DNA. (Tr. p.409; Ex. p.190.) They did not test the leopard print
blanket. (Tr. pp. I 98, 426; Ex. pp.190,.) They did not test E.M.'s bra. (Tr. pp.229, 426; Ex. pp.
118, 190.) They did not test the chux pad that she lay on during the examination. (Tr. pp.229,
426; Ex. pp.118, 190.). They did not test the vaginal swab. (Ex., p.190.) They did not even test
the panties she wore before and after the alleged rape. (Tr. pp. 426; Ex. pp.! 18, 190). Because of
the amylase result, the Idaho State Laboratory tested the left breast swab for DNA. (Tr. p. 426;
Ex. p. 190.)
Caliz was arrest and charged for the alleged rape. (R., pp.22-23) Caliz pleaded not guilty,
and the district court granted him funding to have a "defense expert examine the testing
conducted by the Idaho State Lab." (Tr., p. 9 LL.22-24.) The expert witness, Dr. Greg
Hampikian, reviewed the Idaho State Lab notes, reports, setup sheets, and data and became
concerned that the reference samples from E.M. and Caliz were processed at the same time as the
swab from E.M.'s left breast. (Tr. pp.460-467) In his professional opinion, the analysis was not
done correctly because the testing method created an unnecessary risk of contamination. (Tr.
pp.464-467.) Worse, "[t]here would be no way to tell" if contamination occurred. (Tr. p.465
LL.22-25.) "It would look like evidence that had the suspect's DNA." (Tr. pp.465-466.)
In Dr. Hampikian's words, "[T]he risk-when it's a suspect's profile in evidence, it puts
at risk everything that we do in forensics. The whole reason we're doing this is to see if the
suspect is in the evidence." (Tr. p.477 LL.6-9.) "That an undue risk was taken at the laboratory
that is not in keeping with best practices. That, to [Dr. Hampikian], compromised the evidence
analysis in this case." (Tr. pp.478-479.)

been received back by the State.
3

Caliz's attorney timely filed a witness disclosure indicating that Dr. Hampikian would
testify to potential contamination in this case. (R., pp.104-114.) The State responded by filing
State's Request for Discovery Re: Expert Witness Summary. (R., pp.115-116.) Caliz's attorney
amended the expert witness disclosure--specifying that Dr. Hampikian had reviewed the
laboratory data sent by the Idaho State Police regarding the DNA testing and disclosing
specifically that his opinion was the procedures used in this case go against appropriate lab
protocol to avoid contamination. (R., pp.117-119.)
Over the next week the State filed four motions in limine to limit or exclude Dr.
Hampikian's testimony, four affidavits, four additional motions in limine, and supplemented
discovery six additional times. (Motion in Limine re: DNA Opinion, R., pp. 120-121; Motion in
Limine re: Lab Protocols, R., pp.122-123; Motion in Limine or in the Alternative Motion to
Compel, R., pp.124-125; Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time, R., pp.126-127; Motion in Limine re:
Dr. Hampikian, R., pp.238-239; Affidavit in Support of Motions in Limine, R., pp.128-135;
Second Affidavit in Support of Motions in Limine, R., pp.256-263; Third Affidavit in Support of
Motions in Limine, R., pp.157-173; Fourth Affidavit in Support of Motions in Limine, R.,
pp.194-203; Motion in Limine re: Defendant's Exhibit 203, R., pp.230-231; Motion in Limine
re: Defendant's Exhibits 212-214, R., pp.236-237; Motion in Limine re: Alibi, R., 245-246;
Motion in Limine re: Immigration Status, R., pp.228-229; State's Fourth Supplemental Response
to Request for Discovery, R., pp.155-156; State's Fifth Supplemental Response to Request for
Discovery, R., pp.204-205; State's Sixth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, R.,
pp.209-210; State's Seventh Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, R., pp.242-244;
State's Eight Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, R., pp.249-250; and State's
Ninth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery, R., pp.251-252.) In an attempt to clarify
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the issues, Caliz's counsel filed two offers of proof. (R., pp.138-140, 191-193.) The State
objected to the offer of proof. (R., pp.206-208.)
In the midst of the State's mania, the court held a hearing to addresses the motions. (Tr.
pp.12-31.) The district court ultimately granted the State's motion. (R., pp.182-190.) The district
court reasoned, "It is the burden of the defense, to make a sufficient showing that the expert
would testify that there was likely contamination within a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty before the testimony of Dr. Hampikian would be relevant and admissible." (R., p.188.)
However, the district court noted that the ruling would be subject to a further offer of proof, and
that the testimony would possibly be admissible for impeachment purposes. (R., p.189.)
Dr. Hampikian testified at an offer of proof hearing held the morning of the third day of
trial. (Tr., p.459.) Hampikian was questioned by Caliz's attorney, cross-examined by the State
attorney, which was followed by a redirect by Caliz's attorney. (Tr., pp.459-478) The district
court then proceeded to do its own oral interrogatories. (Tr., pp.478-485.) During the offer of
proof Caliz's attorney attempted to obtain Dr. Hampikian's evaluation of the State's expert's
testimony regarding the risk of contamination, however, the State objected and the Court
indicated that such testimony was not "relevant now." (Tr. p.463 LL.3-17.) Although counsel
argued that it was an offer of impeachment evidence, the district court merely stated that "you
can offer impeachment evidence at the time of trial." (Tr., p.463 LL.11-13.)
The district judge reserved ruling on the motion at that time. (Tr., p.485 LL.18-21.) The
State closed its evidence, and the district court further put off making its decision until the
defense had closed its case. (Tr., p.513 LL.11-14.) Finally, after the defense had put on the
remainder of its case, the district court ruled on whether Dr. Hampikian's testimony would be
allowed. (Tr., pp.535-542.)
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The district court excluded Dr. Hampikian's testimony. (Tr., p542 LL.19-21.)
The case was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict of not guilty on lewd
conduct with a minor, which required genital-to-genital contact, but returned a guilty verdict on
sexual abuse of a child, which would include kissing E.M.'s breast. The court imposed a
sentence of fifteen years, 5 years fixed with an additional 10 years indeterminate. (Tr., p598
LL.12-23.) Caliz timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.363367.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err, and violate Caliz-Bautista's constitutional right to present evidence in
his defense, when it prevented Dr. Hampikian from testifying because contamination had been
placed into issue by the State?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred, And Violated Caliz-Bautista's Constitutional Right To Present
Evidence in His Defense, When It Prevented Dr. Hampikian From Testifying Because
Contamination Had Been Placed Into Issue By the State
A. Introduction

The district court violated Caliz's fundamental right to present evidence in his defense
when it prevented Dr. Hampikian from testifying because contamination was placed into issue
when the State introduced the DNA test results. The potential for contamination of evidence
during the DNA testing process is not speculative. Dr. Hampikian was duly qualified as an
expert in the field of DNA testing. He had reviewed the facts and data relied upon by the State's
expert. His testimony would have been helpful to the jury in interpreting the evidence proffered
by the State. Thus, his testimony was admissible. Caliz' s conviction must be vacated because
Caliz was denied his Constitutional right to present evidence in his defense.
B. Standard Of Review
"The trial court's judgment concerning admission of evidence shall 'only be disturbed on
appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion."' State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,218
(2010) (quoting State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65 (1992)). "Abuse of discretion is determined
by a three-part test which asks whether the district court "( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by
an exercise of reason." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,568 (2007).
However, "the interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is
reviewed de novo." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821 (1998). Admission of evidence at trial is
governed first and foremost by Idaho Rule of Evidence 402's mandate: "All relevant evidence is
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admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts
of this state."
Further, "the relevancy of evidence is not a discretionary matter. There is no issue of
credibility or finding of fact that must be resolved in order for the trial court to reach a decision
on relevancy. Therefore, this Court will review the question ofrelevancy de novo." State v.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764 (1993).
C. The District Court Erred, And Violated Caliz-Bautista's Constitutional Right To Present
Evidence in His Defense, When It Prevented Dr. Hampikian From Testifying Because

The Testimony Was Relevant And Admissible
Defendant has a right to present evidence at trial. U.S. Const.amend VI. "This right is a
fundamental element of due process of law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)). The
right to present a defense includes the right to offer testimony of witnesses, compel their
attendance, and to present the defendant's version of the facts "to the jury so it may decide where
the truth lies." Id.
When the defendant has been denied a fair opportunity to present evidence and defend
against the charge, the conviction must be overturned. State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671
(Ct. App. 2003).

1.

Dr. Hampikian's Testimony Was Relevant And Admissible Under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 702

Eugenio Caliz-Bautista was denied the opportunity to present evidence in his defense at
trial because the district court baselessly excluded the testimony and opinions of his expert
witness.
Evidence that is relevant to a "material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged"
is typically admissible. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,596 (2007). Relevant evidence is anything
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that has a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or Jess probable than it would be without the
evidence." I.R.E. 401.
Expert testimony is admissible when it can either (1) make a fact in issue more or less
like, or (2) help the jury understand the evidence. I.R.E. 702. "If scientific, technical, other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that there are
two factors to be considered before admitting expert testimony: first, whether the expert is
qualified to testify on the subject, and second, whether the expert's testimony will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584,
599 (2013); Daubert v. Merrell Dow ?harm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590-91 (1993). In this case,
Dr. Hampikian was unquestionably qualified as an expert. (Tr. 459 ll. 11-14.) Thus, only the
second factor is at issue here.
The Daubert Court noted that the second factor "goes primarily to relevance," and one
aspect of such a relevancy analysis is "whether expert testimony proffered in the case is
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute."
590 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
In their case in chief, the State's own experts testified to the risk of contaminating
samples, and the preventative measure they took to limit that risk. (Tr., p.231 LL.14-22; p.233
LL.19-25; p.234 LL.20-25; pp.320-321; p.347 LL.12-15; p.348 LL.10-19; pp.389-390; pp.436-
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446.) Given the amount of time discussing contamination, it can hardly be argued that opinion
of an expert in the field would be irrelevant.
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "When determining the admissibility of an
expert's opinion, the focus of the trial court's inquiry is on the principles and methodology used
and not the conclusions they generate." J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146
Idaho 311, 315 (2008) (citations omitted). While expert testimony "which is speculative,
conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record" is ofno assistance to the trier of fact and
as such, is inadmissible, Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834,838 (2007), it is not
the district court's role to "interpret" the proposed testimony and decide whether it is reliable or
not. Rather, "[s]o long as the principles and methodology behind a theory are valid and reliable,
the theory need not be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted." Coombs v. Curnow, 148
Idaho 129, 140-41 (2009) (citing Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834,838 (2007)).
At trial, State experts spent a great deal ohime discussing contamination and what is
done to prevent contamination. (Tr., p.231 LL.14-22; p.233 LL.19-25; p.234 LL.20-25; pp.320321; p.347 LL.12-15; p.348 LL. I 0-19; pp.389-390; pp.436-446.) The experts, however, could
not testify with precision to the efficacy of the preventative measures. (Tr., p.443 LL.13-25;
p.446 LL.2-8.) For example, the State expert acknowledged that the "blank control" does not
offer "conclusive proof that individual samples were not contaminated." (Tr., p.443 LL.16-25.)
Even with a normal control contamination is still possible. Ultimately, although the risk of
contamination may not be quantifiable, the risk of sample contamination is not speculative.

It was error for the district court to require a definitive and quantifiable expression of risk
of contamination as a prerequisite of admission under l.R.E. 702 because this approach defines
the admissibility of expert testimony-quite literally-by the results they generate (i.e. the only
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admissible expert testimony is what can be expressed probabilistically). (Tr., p. 541 LL.16-20.)
It further compounds the error to use a more-probable-than-not litmus test for admission
because it further defines the admission of expert testimony by the conclusions generated (i.e.
the only admissible expert testimony is what can be expressed probabilistically, and that also
has a higher probability of occurrence than non-occurrence). It is flawed logic that dictates that
something must be speculative, merely because it is not readily quantifiable.
Notably, while in many legal context conjecture could be defined as "reasoned doubt"
without proof, in the criminal law context, doubt based on reason and common sense is the basis
of decisions without the necessity proving up the doubt to any degree (certainly not to a level
where it is more-probable-than-not). (R., p.310).
Dr. Hampikian could properly testify regarding the potential sources of contamination,
his experience with contamination, his experience and impression of what constitutes standard
laboratory protocols, what the national standards for laboratories are, what best practices are,
and his experience with methods to reduce the potential for contamination. All of these issues
were raised when the State chose to introduce DNA evidence. It was error to bar Dr.
Hampikian's testimony.
2.

Dr. Hampikian's Testimony Was Relevant And Admissible As Impeachment
Evidence

"Disputes as to the strength of [an expert's] credentials, faults in his use of [a particular]
methodology, or lack of textual authority for his opinion, go to the weight, not the admissibility,
of his testimony." McCullock v. HB. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1995). "In most
cases, objections to the inadequacies of a study are more appropriately considered an objection
going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Vigorous cross-examination of
a study's inadequacies allows the jury to appropriately weigh the alleged defects and reduces the
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possibility of prejudice." Hemmings v. Tidyman 's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)
(internal citations omitted). As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, any "lack of
textual authority" for an expert's opinion goes to the weight, not the admissibility of an expert's
testimony. McCullock, 61 F.3d. at 1044. And though the decision to admit expert opinion
testimony is within the discretion of the district court, "the determination of its weight lies with
the jury." Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 602 (citing State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 299 (1971)).
"While the court must 'distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the selfvalidating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs,' it
may not 'substitute its judgment for that of the relevant scientific community.'" Coombs v.
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 141 (2009) (quoting Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46 (Ct. App.

1992)). "So long as the principles and methodology behind a theory are valid and reliable, the
theory need not be commonly agreed upon or generally accepted." Id. at 140-41 (citing Weeks v.
Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 838 (2007).

The district court noted while ruling on Dr. Hampikian's testimony, "while I understand
that he may have his own opinions as to how labs should conduct DNA testing, his opinion
alone does not necessarily manifest or create the standard by which labs perform their required
testing services." (Tr., p.540 LL.10-14.)2 Whether Dr. Hampikian's testimony creates a standard
by which the jury should evaluate the ISP laboratory is a question committed solely to the jury.
(R., pp.311-312.) It is the province of the jury-and the jury alone-to determine what

2

During its remarks, the district court also noted "that I do believe, in my considered opinion, that the
defense's disclosures at this time do not comply with 702, 703, and 705 or within the contemplation of
Rule 16." (Tr., p.540 LL.5-9.) Rather than dwell on the remark, I would simply note that the district court
failed to consider prejudice to the state-or to find that the lack of did prejudice the state, failed to
consider options to elevated that prejudice, the state did not ask for additional time, nor did the district
court consider a continuance at the pre-trial hearing where it heard the motions in limine, failed to make a
finding or rule as to non-compliance with disclosure requirements, which all ultimately fail to create an
adequate alternative basis upon which it could be upheld on appeal. State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538, 543
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testimony to believe, and what testimony not to believe; determining which experts to believe or
not believe; determining whether to accept circumstantial evidence or to require direct evidence.
Under our system of justice, a defendant has a right to present evidence and to present
testimony and evidence to help a jury evaluate the evidence offered by the State against him.
Rule 702 specifically allows for expert testimony that would help the jury "understand the
evidence". In this case, Dr. Hampikian's testimony was offered for impeachment-to help the
jury understand and evaluate the State's evidence and the testimony given by the State's
witnesses. (Tr., pp.459, 542-543.)
Most notably on direct examination, the State plainly state that there was no risk of
contamination in this case:
Q. So is there any risk of the unknown sample, or the sample from [E.M.]' s body
becoming contaminated with the known sample, the cheeks, by running those tests?
A.No .....

(Tr., p.425 LL.18-22.)
Q .... Did I hear your testimony correctly that you indicated there's no risk there was

contamination in this case?
A. Based on everything I have looked at, there is no indication that contamination
occurred in this case.
(Tr., p.456 LL.9-14.)
Caliz has a due process right to present evidence and testimony that would help the jury
understand the testimony given by the State's experts. Dr. Hampikian indicated in the offer of
proof his position that "[a] needless risk was taken without any real benefit to the laboratory or
certainly to the scientific process." Dr. Hampikian formed the opinion based on his review of
documents produced by the ISP lab, (Tr., p.460 LL.5-11; p.464 LL.3-19) the ISP manual, (Tr.,
pp.4 70-4 71 ), and "every textbook in the field that I can recall." (Tr., p.461 LL.16-17.)

(2002); see e.g. Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 902 (2016) (for a violation of discovery rules to occur the
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The problem is that if a DNA molecule was "transferred to the lip of the tube, that
evidence would appear to have had the suspect's DNA originally but actually was introduced in
the laboratory." (Tr., p.465 LL.13-21.) "There would be no way to tell" that is what happened.
(Tr., p.465 LL.24-25.) "It would look like evidence that had the suspect's DNA." (Tr., pp.465466.) Although it may be only a small increased risk of contamination caused by the way the lab
handled the evidence in this case, the "proper procedures were not followed, ... the best practices
were not followed." (Tr., p.470 LL. 17-18.)
It is appropriate and fair that a defendant be able to let the jury know that the ISP
laboratory was taking needless risks during the evaluation of the evidence, which would be used
against him at trial. It is inappropriate and fundamentally unfair to prevent a defendant from
providing this information to the jury.
CONCLUSION
Eugenio Caliz-Bautista respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and
remand his case for further proceedings because the district court unfairly prevented him from
presenting admissible evidence in his defense.
DATED this 61h day of April, 2017.

Calbo & DePew - Jerome County Public Defenders

court must set a date in the pretrial order),

15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
The undersigned does hereby certify that the electronic brief submitted is in compliance with all
of the req uirements set o ut in out in I.A.R . 34. 1, and that an electronic copy was served o n each

party at the followi ng email address(es):

Office of the Attorney General
C riminal Di vision
P.O. Box 83720
Boise. ID 83 720
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise. ID 83720

(X) E-mail
ecft'a,ag. idaho.gov

(X) E-mai l
supremecourtdocuments@.idcourts. net

Dated and certifi ed this 61h of April , 2017.

